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COMMENT
SILENCING THE BALLOT:
JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT POLITICAL
MOVEMENTS
Michael J. Levens'
I. INTRODUCTION
Over time, courts have become more involved-often by necessity-in
contentious political and cultural issues such as abortion, pornography,'
capital punishment, hate speech,' religious expression,' the definition of
marriage,' and even the health care of every citizen.' Consequently, many
Americans attempt to use the courts to further certain political agendas.'
This is a dangerous use of the one branch of government that is generally
meant to be apolitical.' This political engagement by the courts erodes
judicial independence and undermines the original responsibility of the
judiciary to protect individual rights against majoritarian excesses and to
ensure that the Constitution is upheld.10 In fact, the Founders believed that
the judiciary would be "the weakest of the three departments of power"
t Articles & Book Reviews Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 8. J.D.
Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2014); B.A., Political Science, University of
Texas-Arlington (2010). I dedicate this article to my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, my family,
and my beautiful bride, Brooke.
1. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
2. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,446-47 (2008).
4. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
439 (2006); see also Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
890 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,969 (Mass. 2003).
7. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607-08 (2012).
8. See generally THE END OF DEMOCRACY?: THE JUDICIAL USURPATION OF POLITICS
(Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1997) (providing a collection of articles discussing judicial activism).
9. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (explaining that courts are
limited by justiciability doctrines and the idea of the separation of powers and may not
answer political questions).
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 413, 416 (Alexander Hamilton) (Hackett Pub. Co. ed.,
2005).
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because it is "least in a capacity to annoy or injure" the American people."
However, the judiciary is now the branch that many activists seek to utilize
to further political agendas when they lack the support or power to advance
their interests in the other branches of government.12 Within the context of
direct democracy movements, the politicization of the judiciary has resulted
in the integration of judges in the politics of initiative campaigns.
Nearly half of the states, along with the District of Columbia, have
afforded their citizens the legislative power to propose, enact, or repeal
constitutional amendments or statutes through ballot initiatives. 4 This
power is subject to certain restrictions such as requiring the legislation's
proponents to meet certain procedural requirements" or excluding certain
topics from the people's power to legislate. 6 Courts widely agree that
11. Id. at 412-13. However, the Anti-Federalists argued that the courts would eventually
refuse to be bound by the law:
There is no authority that can remove them from office for any errors or want
of capacity, or lower their salaries, and in many cases their power is superior to
that of the legislature.
1st. There is no power above them that can correct their errors or controul
[sic] their decisions-The adjudications of this court are final and irreversible,
for there is no court above them to which appeals can lie, either in error or on
the merits.-In this respect it differs from the courts in England, for there the
house of lords is the highest court, to whom appeals, in error, are carried from
the highest of the courts of law.
Brutus, XV, N.Y. J., Mar. 20, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 437, 439
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
12. Teresa Stanton Collett, Judicial Independence and Accountability in an Age of
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 41 LoY. U.CHI. L.J. 327, 343 (2010).
13. Craig B. Holman & Robert Stern, Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing
Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1239, 1264 (1998).
14. Michael J. Farrell, The Judiciary and Popular Democracy: Should Courts Review
Ballot Measures Prior to Elections?, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 919, 919 (1984).
15. See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(2)(c) (1902, amended 1968) (requiring proponents
of a proposed constitutional amendment to collect valid signatures in support of the
proposal equaling eight percent of the total number of votes cast for all gubernatorial
candidates at the most recent general election held to elect a full-term governor); see also
Kays v. McCall, 418 P.2d 511, 517 (Or. 1966) (en banc) (per curiam).
16. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7 (initiative or referendum not to be used to
dedicate revenue, make or repeal appropriations, create courts or define courts' jurisdiction);
ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (initiative limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in
article IV of state constitution); MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, Initiative, pt. 2, § 2
(initiative not to relate to religion, court system, search and seizure, martial law, freedom of
speech, freedom of press, freedom of elections or right of peaceful assembly).
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reviewing compliance with such technical and procedural requirements
prior to enactment is entirely proper.17 Most courts will not entertain a
substantive challenge to a ballot initiative prior to its adoption;'8 however, a
minority of jurisdictions will undertake such review."
This Comment begins by analyzing the nature of the ballot initiative
right and the issues involved in substantive review of a ballot initiative prior
to its enactment. Next, this Comment considers the current split among
jurisdictions regarding such review and the particularly aggressive policies
of Oklahoma courts to declare ballot initiatives unconstitutional prior to
their enactment. Finally, this Comment concludes that, because such review
is improper, when a state court relies on federal law as its basis for striking
down an initiative, the proponents of that measure may seek an appeal in
federal court.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The State-Created Initiative Right
Many states have created a right for citizens to place issues on the ballot,
and every state has enacted some legislative process for the government
itself to place issues on the ballot.20 In the states that afford this right to
citizens, it has either been reserved specifically within the state constitution
or has been granted to the citizens of that state by the legislature.2' This is
not a right that is provided by the federal Constitution.22 Furthermore, it is
not inherent in the First Amendment right to petition one's government."
However, once the initiative right is recognized or created by either the state
constitution or legislature, it is protected from state regulation that unduly
17. Elizabeth Bircher, Election Law Manual, NCSC ELECTION LAw PROGRAM, 4-9 (2008),
http://www.electionlawissues.org/Resources/Election-Law-Manual.aspx [hereinafter Election
Manual].
18. See Wyo. Nat'l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 286 (Wyo.
1994) (listing cases in which state courts have decided that pre-enactment challenges to an
initiative's constitutionality are and are not justiciable).
19. Id.
20. See INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/
statewidei&r.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2012) (listing state-by-state information on the
initiative and referendum processes available).
21. Election Manual, supra note 17, at 4-1.
22. Hoyle v. Priest, 59 F. Supp. 2d 827, 835 (W.D. Ark. 1999).
23. Id.
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burdens First Amendment rights." Government restrictions on the
initiative right that limit the advocacy of legislation are "'wholly at odds
with the guarantees of the First Amendment.""' Thus, the initiative right
receives some protection from the federal Constitution to the extent that
any state regulation of that right violates core political speech, equal
protection, due process, right of association, etc.2
1. Nature of Ballot Initiatives
States that reserve a legislative power in the people generally do so with
either the power of initiative or referendum. 27 The initiative power is used
primarily to propose new legislation or amendments to existing
legislation." The referendum power, on the other hand, is used to challenge
legislative enactments to prevent them from taking effect.29
The ballot initiative is the purest form of democracy within our fifty-one
systems of government.o In fact, some states consider "[tihe power of the
legislature and the power of the people to legislate through initiative ... [as]
coequal, coextensive, and concurrent [powers that] share 'equal dignity.""'
There are arguments that such a grant of authority to the people actually
violates the federal Constitution's Guarantee Clause, because this type of
direct democracy is irreconcilable with the requirement that each state
maintain a "[r]epublican [florm of [g]overnment."n These arguments,
24. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 426-28 (1988) (concluding that although the right to
an initiative is not guaranteed by the federal Constitution, once an initiative procedure is
created, the state may not place restrictions on the exercise of the initiative that unduly
burden First Amendment rights); see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc.,
525 U.S. 182, 205 (1999).
25. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 428 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, at 50 (1976)).
26. Election Manual, supra note 17, at 4-2; see also Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069,
1101 (Utah 2002) (Thorne, J., dissenting).
27. Election Manual, supra note 17, at 4-2. Note that while the Election Manual lists
recalls with ballot initiatives, recalls are used for removal of officials rather than proposing or
challenging legislation. Id. 4-2 to 4-3.
28. Id. at 4-2.
29. Id. at 4-3.
30. Gallivan, 54 P.3d 1069 at 1081.
31. Id. at 1080; see also McKee v. City of Louisville, 616 P.2d 969,972 (Colo. 1980).
32. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added); see also Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (challenging the initiative process as a violation of the
Guarantee Clause because it was an exercise in direct democracy, not republican government
and holding that whether initiative powers violate the Guarantee Clause is a non-justiciable
political question).
[Vol. 8:169172
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however, have never convinced a court to overturn a state's constitutional
grant or reservation of the initiative power to the people. Rather, courts
have traditionally construed this power broadly in favor of the people's
ability to exercise their legislative authority.3 3 In fact, many courts view
government attempts to limit this right with the closest scrutiny 3"-
although they have recognized that proper limitations may be imposed on
the initiative power.
2. Appropriate Constitutional and Judicial Limits on Initiatives
States usually establish several procedural requirements for the
consideration of ballot initiatives.3 6 Proponents of an initiative may be
required to provide a statement of intent for the initiative to the appropriate
official, meet certain criteria for approval from that official, demonstrate a
level of public support, and provide the required information and
documentation to the state. Courts have upheld these types of procedural
requirements as valid limitations and have found it appropriate to hear pre-
enactment challenges to initiatives for failure to comply with these
requirements." Nevertheless, restrictions that impose burdensome
requirements by substantially limiting ballot access are subject to strict
scrutiny" because the signature gathering process is constitutionally
protected "core political speech." 0 There are certain types of limitations and
33. Colo. Project-Common Cause v. Anderson, 495 P.2d 220, 221 (Colo. 1972); Leg. of
State of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 35 (Cal. 1983) (per curiam) (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
34. Urevich v. Woodard, 667 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1983); see also McKee, 616 P.2d at
972.
35. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 191 (1999) (noting
agreement with Am. Constitutional Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1997),
which upheld Colorado's age restriction, six month circulation limit and affidavit
requirements on initiative petitions).
36. Election Manual, supra note 17, at 4-3.
37. Id.
38. Stumpf v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 124 (Nev. 1992) (finding that the ballot measure
proponent, not the Secretary of State, is responsible for crafting the proposal into proper
legislative or constitutional form); State ex rel. Vickers v. Summit Cnty. Council, 777 N.E.2d
830, 834 (Ohio 2002) (per curiam) (holding that the city council was not legally required to
submit the measure for voter approval where the petition's obsolete election falsification
statement was more than mere technical non-compliance).
39. Hoyle v. Priest, 59 F. Supp. 2d 827, 836 (W.D. Ark. 1999).
40. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988); see also Election Manual, supra note
17, at 4-5. But see Hoyle, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 836 (finding petition requirements that do not
2013] 173
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procedural requirements that courts have deemed to be unduly
burdensome such as extreme restrictions on payment for petition
circulators,4 ' disclosure requirements, 42 and other restraints. 43
Ballot measures can be challenged either for substantive deficiencies or
for procedural failures." Generally, all courts are willing to consider pre-
election review of initiatives for failure to meet procedural requirements.45
These procedural challenges are often brought by opponents of the
initiative to dispute whether the initiative has actually complied, or by the
proponents of the initiative to challenge the constitutionality of the
requirements themselves." These types of procedural challenges are
appropriate for courts to consider; however, courts are split on the
propriety of substantive challenges.47 Courts that refuse to engage in pre-
enactment reviews do so generally for issues of justiciability.1
impact the ability to communicate a message, restrict petition circulation, impact the ability
to communicate with voters, or regulate the content of speech do not impact core political
speech).
41. Meyer, 486 U.S. 414 (striking down a statute criminalizing the use of paid petition
circulators for ballot measures and noting that no such ban was in force for candidacy
petition circulators); Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 971 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding the
prohibition on per signature payment served the important state interest in preventing
forgery and fraud); Term Limits Leadership Council, Inc. v. Clark, 984 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.
Miss. 1997) (granting summary judgment to plaintiffs and finding a constitutional violation
in prohibition on per signature payments and requirement that petition circulators be
qualified electors of the state because the state offered only speculation and not proof that
these requirements were necessary to deter fraud).
42. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197-98 (1999)
(opining that the desire to engage in anonymous speech is greatest when the ballot proposal
is controversial).
43. See generally Election Manual, supra note 17, at 4-3 to 4-8.
44. Id. at 4-9.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See infra, Part II.C.; State ex rel. Fidanque v. Paulus, 688 P.2d 1303 (Or. 1984)
(discussing the ballot qualification process for initiatives and limitations on the court's pre-
election review of initiatives); see also Tilson v. Mofford, 737 P.2d 1367 (Ariz. 1987) (noting
the court's pre-election authority to intervene and enjoin a ballot measure is limited to
situations where the measure is defective in form, fails to meet signature requirements or is
procedurally deficient).
48. See infra, Part II.B.
174 [Vol. 8:169
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B. The Common Problems Involved with Pre-Enactment Reviews
Many courts refuse to engage in a review because it would raise issues of
ripeness and standing," would constitute a violation of separation of
powers,so or would violate the rule against advisory opinions." These issues
of justiciability should bar review of a ballot initiative's substance prior to its
enactment. Further, courts' general disfavor of facial challenges52 to law
should require plaintiffs to pass a high bar when seeking to have an
initiative struck down substantively, prior to its enactment."
1. Issues of Justiciability
While federal justiciability requirements from Article III are not binding
on state courts, many state courts adhere to federal standards of
justiciability." Those state courts that do not apply federal justiciability
standards may be more accessible than federal courts and may exercise
broader jurisdiction." While some states may grant broader jurisdiction to
their courts than that afforded to federal courts by Article III, all states
recognize limitations on that authority and employ some standard of
justiciability." The federal doctrine of justiciability, which is used by many
state jurisdictions, is useful for a discussion on the general issues of
justiciability raised by pre-enactment challenges to ballot initiatives.
49. See McKee v. City of Louisville, 616 P.2d 969,972 (Colo. 1980).
50. See Tilson, 737 P.2d at 1372.
51. See Anderson v. Byrne, 242 N.W. 687, 691 (N.D. 1932).
52. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450-51 (2008).
53. See infra, Part II.B.2.
54. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989); see also Pennell v. City of San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988); Bateman v. Arizona, 429 U.S. 1302, 1305 (1976); Doremus v. Bd. of
Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429,434 (1952).
55. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1833, 1906 (2001).
56. Id.
57. For example, some states allow their courts to issue advisory opinions. See Collett,
supra note 12, at 337; see also Jonathan D. Persky, "Ghosts that Slay": A Contemporary Look
at State Advisory Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REv. 1155 (2005) (analyzing state supreme courts'
advisory opinions between 1990 and 2004).
58. See Hershkoff, supra note 55, at 1838-40.
2013] 175
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a. Issues of standing and ripeness
The federal justiciability prerequisite of standing stems from the Article
III requirement that there be an actual case or controversy." While the
Constitution does not define those terms, the Supreme Court has required
that a plaintiff satisfy three elements.' First, the plaintiff must have suffered
an imminent and concrete injury in fact.6' Second, there must be a causal
connection between that injury and the challenged conduct.62 Last, the
plaintiff must show that the alleged injury would be redressed by a favorable
judgment from the court.6 1
Not only must the plaintiffs have standing, but the claim must also be
ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed "to
prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative
policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete
way by the challenging parties.""
In evaluating a claim to determine whether it is ripe for judicial review,
courts consider both "'the fitness of the issues for judicial decision"' and
"'the hardship of withholding court consideration."6' Furthermore, the
party bringing the suit bears the burden of proving that the claim is ripe for
review.66 In addition to establishing the tests for determining when a claim
is ripe for judicial review, the Supreme Court established a bright-line test
in Texas v. United States' to help determine when a case is per se not ripe:
"A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events
that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all."68
In the context of a pre-enactment challenge, a plaintiff would be unable
to show an imminent or concrete injury because the proposed initiative
59. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,559 (1992).
60. Id. at 560.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 560.
63. Id. at 561.
64. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
65. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010) (quoting
Nat'l Park Hospitality Assn. v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003)).
66. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 315-16 (1991).
67. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296 (1998).
68. Id. at 300 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-
81 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176 [Vol. 8:169
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would not have the force of law to be able to infringe any of the plaintiffs
asserted rights.' Moreover, pre-enactment review meets the test provided
in Texas, because any claim leveled against an initiative prior to its
enactment rests entirely upon future events that may not occur at all. There
is a distinct possibility that a challenged initiative would not garner the
requisite signatures to qualify to be on the ballot or, even if it had received
enough signatures, that it could be voted down by the electorate. Thus, a
claim challenging an initiative prior to its enactment is clearly not ripe and
would serve as a prime example of the type of "premature adjudication" that
the doctrine of ripeness is intended to prevent."o
b. Violations of the separation of powers
Courts and commentators have noted that all justiciability doctrines
limiting judicial authority, especially those of standing and ripeness, stem
from the idea of the separation of powers.7 ' The Supreme Court has
explained:
"All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III-not only
standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like-
relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an
idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and
explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to
the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our
kind of government."
The case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits
on federal judicial power in our system of government.72
This concept was deeply rooted in our system of government because of
the Founders' understanding that "[w]hen great and extraordinary powers
are vested in any man, or body of men, which in their exercise, may operate
to the oppression of the people, it is of high importance that powerful
69. See McKee v. City of Louisville, 616 P.2d 969,972 (Colo. 1980).
70. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
71. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974) (noting that "[t]o permit a complainant who has no
concrete injury to require a court to rule on important constitutional issues in the abstract
would create the potential for abuse of the judicial process, distort the role of the Judiciary in
its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open the Judiciary to an arguable
charge of providing 'government by injunction.'"); Hershkoff, supra note 55, at 1882.
72. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)).
1772013]1
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checks should be formed to prevent the abuse of it."73 Separation of powers
is the machinery that drives the limiting doctrines on courts' authority to
hear cases before there is actual injury, engage in political determinations,
issue advisory opinions, or render moot judgments.'
When a state court reviews legislation pre-enactment, even ballot
initiatives, it is "interfer[ing] with the exercise of the political power of the
people, acting as [a] legislative branch of state government."" The doctrine
of the separation of powers should "forbid the use of judicial power to
prevent or interfere with the legislative process invoked by the initiative
petition."76 Judges should not act as gatekeepers in the political process of
lawmaking by imputing meaning to language prior to its enactment. Such
action is an invasion of the power committed to the legislative branch in a
republican form of government and therefore a violation of the separation
of powers.
c. The rule against advisory opinions
No rule of justiciability is more deeply rooted in federal jurisprudence
than the rule against advisory opinions, and it, like the other doctrines of
justiciability, is "based on the separation of powers doctrine."" The rule
originates from Chief Justice John Jay's decision not to provide advice to
73. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 331
(Ralph Ketcham ed., New Am. Library, 2003) (1788).
74. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752; see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512 (1969);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
75. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 15 (Okla. 1992)
(Alma, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 16.
77. Id. at 19 (Opala, C.J., dissenting). Further, some courts have noted that even if an
initiative is in direct conflict with the Constitution, the courts should not prevent its
enactment. They reject arguments of political or economic expediency and recognize that
they simply lack the authority to interfere with the people's right to enact these types of
initiatives. See Iman v. Bolin, 404 P.2d 705, 709 (Ariz. 1965) ("[E]ven were the measure in
conflict with the Constitution, this has no bearing on the right of the people to enact it. The
same is true of an act of the legislature. Only after legislation becomes law will its
constitutionality be tested." (citations omitted)).
78. See Patrick C. McKeever & Billy Dwight Perry, Note, The Case for an Advisory
Function in the Federal Judiciary, 50 GEO. L.J. 785, 803 (1962) (observing that the prohibition
on advisory opinions is "a tradition so firmly engrained in our constitutional law that the
Court has never questioned and seldom bothered to discuss it in any detail").
79. James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Review of Initiatives
and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 298, 305 (1989).
[Vol. 8:169178
SILENCING THE BALLOT
President George Washington on the policy of neutrality with France."o
Further, this rule stems from the idea that an advisory opinion is not an
exercise of judicial authority at all;" rather, an advisory opinion is merely a
consultative opinion that is not "finally decisive."82 The quintessential
advisory opinion is a judicial opinion on a bill pending in the legislature.
Not all states have the same rule against advisory opinions." In fact,
there are eight states that permit or require their respective state supreme
courts to provide advisory opinions under certain circumstances."
However, even in these states, the courts' advisory authority is still
constrained by certain state constitutional limitations on that power." For
example, Delaware and Florida permit advisory opinions only for matters
concerning the duties of the official requesting the opinion.
In the context of a pre-enactment challenge, because the initiative does
not yet have the force of law behind it, the challenged initiative could not
affect any alleged rights of the challenger." Thus, any action brought
against it would necessarily require the court to issue an advisory opinion
on the constitutionality of proposed legislation."
2. The Disfavor of Facial Challenges
When a court has decided to determine the constitutionality of a ballot
initiative, it must decide by what standard it will handle the facial challenge.
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Salerno" that a plaintiff can
only succeed in a facial challenge by "establish[ing] that no set of
80. Hershkoff, supra note 55, at 1844.
81. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129, 153 (1893).
82. Hershkoff, supra note 55, at 1845.
83. Gordon, supra note 79, at 304-05.
84. Collett, supra note 12, at 337.
85. Id. at 337 n.52 ("Eight states permit or require the state supreme court to give
advisory opinions: Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and South Dakota."); see also Mel A. Topf, The Jurisprudence of the Advisory
Opinion Process in Rhode Island, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 207, 254-56 (1997).
86. Topf, supra note 85, at 214.
87. Id. at 216.
88. McKee v. City of Louisville, 616 P.2d 969,972-73 (Colo. 1980).
89. See McKee, 616 P.2d at 973; Coalson v. City Council of Victoria, 610 S.W.2d 744,
747 (Tex. 1980); State ex rel. Althouse v. City of Madison, 255 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Wis. 1977);
Anderson v. Byrne, 242 N.W. 687, 692 (N.D. 1932).
90. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
2013] 179
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circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid."9' More
recently, however, there has been some speculation as to the validity of this
standard.92 No matter the standard employed, the Supreme Court has
recognized that because of the inherently speculative, possibly premature,
and anti-democratic nature of facial challenges, they should be granted
"sparingly, and only as a last resort."93 Thus, a higher burden should be
placed on those who wish to succeed in a facial challenge than on parties
bringing an as-applied challenge, in order to preserve the integrity of the
court system.
a. Nature of facial challenges and the traditional Salerno standard
The strict rule from Salerno, requiring that a plaintiff establish that no set
of circumstances exists under which the challenged law would be valid,"
supports a limited concept of federal judicial power to render judgments
only "out of the necessity of adjudicating rights in particular cases between
... litigants" who have suffered harm." Additionally, this rule follows the
precedent that "[c]onstitutional judgments... are justified only out of the
necessity of adjudicating rights in particular cases between ... litigants
brought before the Court."96 Such a stringent rule supports the Court's
assertion that as-applied challenges are preferred because facial challenges
"often rest on speculation" as they do not involve specific applications of a
statute, but rather hypothetical applications.97 Consequently, because any
pre-enactment challenge to law is necessarily a facial challenge, such
challenges to ballot initiatives should be judged according to the strictest
standard and should be rarely successful.
In a pre-enactment challenge the courts would "have had no occasion to
construe the law in the context of actual disputes . .. or to accord the law a
91. Id. at 745.
92. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-40 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
93. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
94. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
95. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611.
96. Id.; see also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) ("This Court ... 'has no
jurisdiction to pronounce any statute ... void, because [it is] irreconcilable with the
constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual
controversies.'" (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113
U.S. 33, 39 (1885))).
97. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008).
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limiting construction to avoid constitutional questions." 8 This would deny
the state courts any opportunity to follow the Supreme Court's dictate that
[fi]n evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court must ...
consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency
has proffered."'" Consequently, the Supreme Court has explained that it
prefers to wait for laws to be applied and actually harm a plaintiff before
considering a challenge to their validity.'00
In the more recent decision of Washington State Grange v. Washington
State Republican Party,'' the Supreme Court did in fact rule on a facial
challenge brought against a ballot initiative.o2 This initiative modified the
nomination process for Washington's primary elections that had been
enacted but not completely implemented.' Thus, the Court noted that the
challenge against the initiative was "not in the context of an actual election,
but in a facial challenge."' The Court expressed its long-held belief that
such challenges are disfavored for three reasons.'0o First, "[cilaims of facial
invalidity often rest on speculation. As a consequence, they raise the risk of
'premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones
records.""0 6 Second, facial challenges "run contrary to the fundamental
principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither 'anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance'... 'nor formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
to be applied.""0o Third, "facial challenges threaten to short circuit the
98. Id.; see also Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217,220
(1912) ("How the state court may apply [a statute] to other cases, whether its general words
may be treated as more or less restrained, and how far parts of it may be sustained if others
fail, are matters upon which we need not speculate now.").
99. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1989) (quoting Hoffman
Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982)).
100. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989).
101. Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. 442.
102. Id. at 444.
103. See id. at 448 (finding that the suit was filed "[i]mmediately after the State enacted
regulations to implement 1-872").
104. Id. at 449.
105. Id. at 450-51.
106. Id. at 450 (quoting Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people
from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution.""os
After discussing the disfavor courts have for such challenges, the Court
still subjected the Washington initiative to the facial challenge and decided
that it was constitutional because the facial challenges against the initiative
all depended on mere "possibiit[ies]" and "sheer speculation." 0 9 Thus,
Grange serves as an example of a time when the Court did entertain a facial
challenge against a ballot initiative before it was implemented. However,
this still does not provide precedent for the assertion that it is proper to
review the constitutionality of an initiative before it is even enacted.
Additionally, the issue of whether the case was ripe for judicial review
was never argued before, or decided by, the Court. "When a potential
jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the
decision does not stand for the proposition that no defect existed."' Were
a court to rely on "assumptions that have gone unstated and unexamined,"
it would be risking great error."' In Grange, the issue of whether the claim
was ripe for review was neither decided nor argued, other than one short
and unsourced sentence in a brief before the Court.112 Therefore, Grange
does not provide precedent from the Supreme Court authorizing a court to
entertain a facial challenge against a ballot initiative prior to its enactment.
b. The less stringent Glucksburg standard for facial attacks
In his concurring opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg," Justice Stevens
called into question the Salerno standard for reviewing facial challenges to
law and asserted that the Court has never applied the strict Salerno standard
108. Id. at 451.
109. Id. at 454.
110. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448 (2011); see, e.g.,
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535 n.5 (1974) ("[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been
passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a
subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us."); United States v. L.A.
Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) ("Even as to our own judicial power or
jurisdiction, this Court has followed the lead of Chief Justice Marshall who held that this
Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned
and it was passed sub silentio.").
111. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449.
112. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 15, Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican
Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008), No. 06-730, 2007 WL 2679380, at *15 ("The political parties'
reasoning.. . does not present an actual ballot that is ripe for judicial review.").
113. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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literally."' Justice Stevens then advocated for a more lenient standard that
merely "requires the challenger to establish that the invalid applications of a
statute 'must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to
the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.""" Later, the Supreme Court
acknowledged and applied this standard along with the Salerno standard."'
Finally, in a very recent decision, the Supreme Court combined the two
standards into a single rule, providing that "[t]o succeed in a typical facial
attack, [a party] would have to establish 'that no set of circumstances exists
under which [the law] would be valid,' or that the statute lacks any 'plainly
legitimate sweep."'" However, the Court acknowledged that determining
"[w]hich standard applies in a typical case is a matter of dispute.""'
It is apparent that there is a measure of contention among the justices as
to which standard to apply when reviewing a facial challenge to a law;
however, it is undisputed that, were the Court to adopt this lower standard,
it would lead to more acts of the legislative branch being declared
unconstitutional. Our system of government features a particular
structure-the separation of powers-and "[ilt is axiomatic to the
American political order that the legislature makes the laws, the executive
enforces the laws, and the judiciary interprets and applies the laws."" 9 If the
courts continue to employ this lower standard, thereby invalidating an
increased number of the legal expressions of the will of the people, it will
create a reality that the courts are imposing their own values rather than
requiring compliance with the Constitution.'20 Such action will cause the
114. Id. at 740.
115. Id. at 740 n.7 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,615 (1973)).
116. Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449. "While some Members of the Court have
criticized the Salerno formulation, all agree that a facial challenge must fail where the statute
has a 'plainly legitimate sweep."' Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-
40 & n.7 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010).
118. Id.
119. Collett, supra note 12, at 347.
120. See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks, The Use of Policy in Judicial Reasoning: A
Reconceptualization Before and After Bush v. Gore, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 33, 34 (2002)
(arguing that judges "make up" policy, as well as "discover" and "vindicate" policy during
judicial policy formation); Stephen B. Presser, Judicial Ideology and the Survival of the Rule of
Law: A Field Guide to the Current Political War over the Judiciary, 39 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 427,
429 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court makes law rather than interprets it and insisting
that the courts have become "partners" with the legislature in law making).
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people to view the courts as another political branch, thereby decreasing
public confidence in the courts as unbiased arbiters of conflicts.12'
Regardless of the effect that this standard will have on the legitimacy of
the courts, many jurisdictions have begun to recognize or apply the "plainly
legitimate sweep" standard in reviewing facial attacks to law.'22 If facial
challenges brought against ballot initiatives, prior to their enactment, are
reviewed according to this standard, it is more probable that they will
succeed. The burden of proof would remain with the party bringing the
facial challenge, so doubts are resolved against invalidation.'23 However, the
Court could plausibly attempt to interpret the substantial effect of that
initiative prior to any limited application ascribed by the legislature or state
courts.'24
C. The Split in Authority Among States with Ballot Initiatives
There is disagreement among the various jurisdictions on whether it is
appropriate to conduct a pre-enactment review of a ballot initiative on the
grounds that it is unconstitutional. However, a majority of courts will
review an initiative's constitutionality not only post-election but also post-
121. See generally Craig B. Holman & Robert Stern, Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives:
The Changing Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1239 (1998). Some more
recent decisions of the Supreme Court may be reasonably interpreted as an effort by the
Court to return to a commitment to judicial restraint. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 167-68 (2007) (rejecting pre-enforcement facial challenge to the federal partial-birth
abortion ban); Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (rejecting claims that the California
marriage amendment violated the California Constitution). If this trend continues, the
American confidence and trust in the judiciary as a non-political branch of government
might be restored. See Collett, supra note 12, at 349.
122. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 2012);
Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 869 n.5 (8th Cir. 2009); Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d
356, 360 (6th Cir. 2008); Hersh v. United States ex rel. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 743, 762 n.23 (5th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Simington, EP-10-CR-2275-KC, 2011 WL 145326 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 14, 2011); Ga. Outdoor Network, Inc. v. Marion Cnty., Ga., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1360
(M.D. Ga. 2009).
123. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 618 (1973) (rejecting facial challenge
because plaintiff failed to show that statute was substantially invalid).
124. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1989) ("[I1n evaluating a facial
challenge to a state law, a federal court must ... consider any limiting construction that a
state court or enforcement agency has proffered." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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enactment.12 A minority of courts have decided to exercise authority over
ballot initiatives that have yet to reach the electorate and prevent them from
appearing on the ballot if they are clearly unconstitutional.126 For many
jurisdictions, this practice is not new; rather, some state courts have
permitted such reviews for decades.127 The subsequent paragraphs will
provide examples from the various jurisdictions that present this split in
authority.
1. States That Deny Pre-Enactment Reviews
The majority of jurisdictions hold to the rule that it is improper to
engage in a substantive pre-enactment review of a ballot initiative.'2 8 Many
courts refuse to engage in a review because it would be a violation of
separation of powers, 12 would raise issues of ripeness and standing,30 or
would violate the rule against advisory opinions."' Some courts have even
noted that pre-enactment reviews are non-justiciable even if the initiative is
in direct "conflict with the Constitution." 32
125. See Wyo. Nat'l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 286 (Wyo.
1994) (listing cases in which state courts have decided that pre-enactment challenges to an
initiative's constitutionality are and are not justiciable).
126. Id.; see also In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question 642, 838 P.2d 1, 13
(Okla. 1992).
127. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 13 (citing In re Initiative Petition No.
348, 820 P.2d 772, 780 (Okla. 1991)); In re Initiative Petition No. 341, State Question No.
627, 796 P.2d 267,269 (Okla. 1990); In re Initiative Petition No. 315, State Question No. 553,
649 P.2d 545, 547-48 (Okla. 1982)).
128. See Karpan, 881 P.2d at 286 (listing cases in which state courts have decided that
pre-enactment challenges to an initiative's constitutionality are and are not justiciable); see
also Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 1969); Speed v. Hosemann, 68 So.
3d 1278, 1281 (Miss. 2011); Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1224, 1231 (Nev. 2006);
Tilson v. Mofford, 737 P.2d 1367, 1372 (Ariz. 1987); Associated Taxpayers of Idaho, Inc. v.
Cenarrusa, 725 P.2d 526, 526 (Idaho 1986); State ex rel. Cramer v. Brown, 454 N.E.2d 1321,
1322 (Ohio 1983); McKee v. City of Louisville, 616 P.2d 969, 972 (Colo. 1980); Coalson v.
City Council of Victoria, 610 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. 1980); State ex rel. Althouse v. City of
Madison, 255 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Wis. 1977); Johnson v. City of Astoria, 363 P.2d 571, 575
(Or. 1961); Anderson v. Byrne, 242 N.W. 687, 691-92 (N.D. 1932).
129. See Tilson, 737 P.2d at 1372.
130. See McKee, 616 P.2d at 972-73.
131. See Anderson, 242 N.W. at 692.
132. Iman v. Bolin, 404 P.2d 705, 709 (Ariz. 1965) ("[E]ven were the measure in conflict
with the Constitution, this has no bearing on the right of the people to enact it. The same is
true of an act of the legislature. Only after legislation becomes law will its constitutionality be
tested." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Arizona is among the jurisdictions that follow this majority rule and
takes a hard stance against pre-enactment reviews of ballot initiatives.'
Arizona repeatedly dismissed actions challenging ballot initiatives on their
substance."' It declines such reviews because they violate the separation of
powers and are not ripe for adjudication as there are no actual "litigants
whose rights are affected.""' In fact, the Arizona Supreme Court has held
that the initiative right reserved to the people in the Arizona Constitution is
a legislative power "as great as that of the legislature."136 Thus, in Arizona, a
ballot initiative's constitutionality can only be properly adjudicated by the
courts after its enactment because a measure's "conflict with the
Constitution ... has no bearing on the right of the people to enact it."'
Colorado provides the same protection to the initiative right."' Like
Arizona, Colorado cites to the doctrine of separation of powers; however, it
also references the rule against advisory opinions."'9 Colorado courts begin
their justification of this rule with the recognition that "' [a]ll political power
is vested in and derived from the people,' and all government originates
from the people.""o Furthermore, the courts recognize that the people of
Colorado make it clear that this power is not one "grant[ed] to the people
but a reservation by them for themselves.""' Thus, the Colorado courts
133. See Tilson, 737 P.2d at 1372; Iman, 404 P.2d at 709; State v. Osborn, 143 P. 117, 118-
19 (Ariz. 1914); accord Williams v. Parrack, 319 P.2d 989, 990-91 (Ariz. 1957).
134. Tilson, 737 P.2d at 1372; Iman, 404 P.2d at 709; Osborn, 143 P. at 118-19.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1369; see ARIz. CONST. art. XXII, § 14.
137. Iman, 404 P.2d at 709.
138. See McKee v. City of Louisville, 616 P.2d 969, 972-73 (Colo. 1980) ("Nor may the
courts interfere with the exercise of this right by declaring unconstitutional or invalid a
proposed measure before the process has run its course and the measure is actually adopted.
Then and only then, when actual litigants whose rights are affected are before it, may the
court determine the validity of the legislation."); City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, 293 P.2d 974,
976 (Colo. 1956); Speer v. People, 122 P. 768, 771 (Colo. 1912).
139. City of Rocky Ford, 293 P.2d at 976 ("The separation of governmental powers must
be held inviolate, therefore the trial court or this court may not intrude upon the legislative
powers through an advisory opinion.").
140. McKee, 616 P.2d at 972 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1); see also Hudson v. Annear,
75 P.2d 587, 589 (Colo. 1938).
141. McKee, 616 P.2d at 972; see also In re Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66, 71
(Colo. 1962).
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hold the power of the initiative as "a fundamental right at the very core of
[their] republican form of government." 42
Oregon has a similar view to that of Arizona and Colorado.' Oregon
courts will abstain from review until enactment, even if the ballot initiative
is clearly unconstitutional,'" and, generally, this abstention flows from a
desire to maintain the doctrine of separation of powers." Alternatively,
Idaho has refused to engage in such reviews, but not because of the doctrine
of separation of powers.'" Rather, Idaho courts have continually pointed to
issues of justiciability,"' relying on standards from the United States
Supreme Court to guide them in deciding when a justiciable case or
controversy is before it."'
Mississippi has flip-flopped on its rule for pre-enactment reviews on the
substance of initiatives.14 The original rule provided by Power v. Ratliff'0
was that "courts have no more right to interfere with this legislative act of
the people than they have to prevent an . .. attempt of the Legislature to
pass a law."' However, the Mississippi Supreme Court broke from this rule
142. McKee, 616 P.2d at 972; Bernzen v. City of Boulder, 525 P.2d 416, 419 (Colo. 1974);
Brownlow v. Wunsch, 83 P.2d 775, 776-77 (Colo. 1938).
143. Barnes v. Paulus, 588 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
144. Johnson v. City of Astoria, 363 P.2d 571, 575 (Or. 1961) ("'If [a proposed initiative]
is unconstitutional and should be adopted, the Constitution itself will require the courts, if
the question is properly presented, to pronounce the measure to be unconstitutional, but the
courts possess no such power as to any proposed bill before the same has become a law
145. Johnson, 363 P.2d at 592 ("[T]he courts possess no such power as to any proposed
bill before the same has become a law and neither the executive department of the state nor
the judicial department has authority to say to either of the legislative branches of the state
146. See Associated Taxpayers of Idaho, Inc. v. Cenarrusa, 725 P.2d 526, 526 (Idaho
1986); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1980); Harris v. Cassia
Cnty., 681 P.2d 988, 991 (Idaho 1984).
147. See supra Part II.B.L.
148. Cenarrusa, 725 P.2d at 526 ("Petitioners' action attacking the constitutionality of the
proposed initiative is premature and presents no justiciable controversy at this time. For this
Court to act, '[there] must be a real and substantial controversy . ... ').
149. Compare Speed v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1278, 1281 (Miss. 2011) (holding that a pre-
enactment review is inappropriate), with In re Proposed Initiative Measure No. 20, 774 So.
2d 397 (Miss. 2000) (holding that a pre-enactment review is appropriate).
150. Power v. Ratliff, 72 So. 864 (Miss. 1916).
151. Id. at 867.
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in In re Proposed Initiative Measure 20,152 where the court held implicitly
that substantive challenges to proposed initiatives also are proper for pre-
enactment review.15 3 Later, Speed v. Hoseman" abrogated that ruling; the
court ridiculed the Measure 20 court for breaking from the long established
precedent against such reviews.' Thus, Mississippi has returned to its
original rule forbidding pre-enactment substantive reviews of proposed
initiatives. 56
Other jurisdictions that have adopted this majority rule include
Nevada,' North Dakota, 58 Ohio' 59 Texas,160 Wisconsin,'6' and even some
federal circuits.'62 Still other jurisdictions adopt this general rule but have
allowed a substantive review of ballot initiatives prior to enactment when it
relates to some subject matter that has been specifically excluded from the
people's authority to legislate.'16
152. In re Proposed Initiative Measure No. 20, 774 So. 2d 397 (Miss. 2000).
153. Id. at 401.
154. Speed v. Hosemann, 68 So. 3d 1278 (Miss. 2011).
155. Id. at 1281 ("Citing no constitutional, statutory, or caselaw authority, the Measure 20
Court stated that 'proposed initiatives are subject to review of form and, therefore, content
inasmuch as content affects form and form affects content.' The lack of authority is no
surprise, as such authority is nonexistent. In fact, our existing caselaw has held exactly the
opposite. According to Ratliff 'the courts ... must deal altogether with the finished
product.'" (quoting In re Proposed Initiative Measure 20, 774 So. 2d at 401 and Ratliff, 72 So.
at 867)).
156. Id. (citing to MIss. CONST. art. 15, § 273(9); MIss. CODE ANN. § 23-17-23 (2007))
(overruling In re Proposed Initiative Measure 20 to the extent that it allows pre-enactment
substantive review of proposed initiatives).
157. Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1224, 1231 (Nev. 2006).
158. Anderson v. Byrne, 242 N.W. 687, 692 (N.D. 1932).
159. State ex rel. Cramer v. Brown, 454 N.E.2d 1321, 1322 (Ohio 1983).
160. Coalson v. City Council of Victoria, 610 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. 1980).
161. State ex rel. Althouse v. City of Madison, 255 N.W.2d 449, 449-50 (Wis. 1977).
162. Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 1969).
163. Wyo. Nat'l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 286 (Wyo.
1994); see, e.g., Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm. v. D.C. Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 441
A.2d 889, 914 (D.C. 1981) (holding that it was appropriate to strike down an initiative that
would have permitted the appropriation of funds before it was enacted as such initiatives
were prohibited by law); Whitson v. Anchorage, 608 P.2d 759, 761-62 (Alaska 1980); Bowe
v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 69 N.E.2d 115, 127 (Mass. 1946).
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2. States That Allow Pre-Enactment Reviews
Despite the sound rationale espoused by the majority of jurisdictions,
some courts conduct pre-enactment substantive reviews of proposed
initiatives. These courts justify their position by pointing to the judicial
economy, as they believe it would be an abuse of the initiative right to allow
invalid proposals to be submitted to the electorate.'" These jurisdictions
entertain claims that a proposed initiative violates either the state or the
federal constitution.16 s Most of these courts require that the initiative in
question be clearly or patently unconstitutional before they will review its
substance.16 1
The District of Columbia is one of the jurisdictions that have split from
the majority rule.'67 D.C. courts acknowledge that pre-enactment reviews
are "imprudent" but allow for a pre-enactment substantive review of an
initiative in "extreme cases" where the initiative is "patently
unconstitutional."'" In Hessey v. Burden, the court examined the views of
the various jurisdictions that provide an initiative right to its citizens and
held that, in these rare circumstances of patent unconstitutionality, the
courts could review the initiative on its merits. 6' The court noted the
dangers in such a review, arguing that "[judges who strike a legislative
proposal from the ballot before the voters have a chance to vote on it 'could
be perceived, at least by the measure's supporters, as meddlers interfering
with the process of popular legislation.""" Such an observation could harm
the legitimacy of the judiciary. Consequently, courts weigh this perception
against the inefficiency that would be the inevitable result of holding an
election for an initiative that, if adopted, would be struck down by the
courts.1 71
164. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 10 (Okla.
1992); City of Newark v. Benjamin, 364 A.2d 563, 568 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
165. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 10; State ex rel. Harper v.
Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826, 828 (Mont. 1984).
166. See Karpan, 881 P.2d at 286; Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 574 (D.C. 1992); Gray
v. Winthrop, 156 So. 270, 272 (Fla. 1934).
167. Hessey, 615 A.2d at 574.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 572-74.
170. Id. at 573 (citations omitted).
171. Id. ("Efficiency and fiscal responsibility are also put forth as reasons for pre-election
review: 'The court ought not to compel the doing of a vain thing and the useless spending of
public money.' Holding an election on an unconstitutional initiative would clearly be
2013] 189
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Many of the other jurisdictions that engage in these reviews follow a
similar rule and rationale to that applied in Hessey. Jurisdictions that have
adopted this rationale include California,172 Connecticut,173 Florida,'74
Louisiana,"' Kentucky,' 6  New Jersey," and Wyoming."' Other
jurisdictions, like Oklahoma, will review constitutional claims against a
proposed initiative regardless of whether the initiative is clearly
unconstitutional or not.' 9 The Oklahoma courts have engaged in this type
of review for decades.' In fact, Oklahoma's legislature has arguably
granted this power to the courts by statute where it purportedly gave the
Oklahoma Supreme Court the right to hear "arguments for and against the
sufficiency" of an initiative.'"' However, it may be argued that when taken
in context of the rest of this section of the Oklahoma statute, "sufficiency"
refers merely to the procedural constitutional requirements rather than the
inefficient in hindsight, although that inefficiency must be weighed against the cost in
judicial resources of pre-election review." (quoting Utz v. City of Newport, 252 S.W.2d 434,
437 (Ky. 1952))).
172. Brosnahan v. Eu, 641 P.2d 200, 201 (Cal. 1982); Gayle v. Hamm, 101 Cal. Rptr. 628,
628 (1972); Wind v. Hite, 374 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1962).
173. W. Hartford Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. Streeter, 462 A.2d 379, 381-82 (Conn. 1983).
174. Gray v. Winthrop, 156 So. 270, 272 (Fla. 1934); Dulaney v. City of Miami Beach, 96
So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
175. State ex rel. Bussie v. Fant, 43 So. 2d 217, 219 (La. 1949).
176. Utz v. City of Newport, 252 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Ky. 1952) (citing to State ex rel.
Cranfill v. Smith, 48 S.W.2d 891 (Mo. 1932); State ex rel. Foote v. Bd. of Comm'rs of City of
Hutchinson, 144 P. 241, 243 (Kan. 1914); State ex rel. Davies v. White, 136 P. 110 (Nev.
1913); Hodges v. Dawdy, 149 S.W. 656 (Ark. 1912); Att'y Gen. ex rel. Hudson v. Common
Council of City of Detroit, 129 N.W. 879 (Mich. 1911); Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 32 N.E.
836 (Ind. 1892)).
177. City of Newark v. Benjamin, 364 A.2d 563, 568 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
178. Wyo. Nat'1 Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 288 (Wyo.
1994).
179. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 10 (Okla. 1992)
("However, if an unconstitutional measure garners enough signatures to be presented to the
people and is challenged on constitutional grounds, pre-submission judicial review is
appropriate.").
180. Id. at 13 (citing to In re Initiative Petition No. 348, State Question No. 640, 820 P.2d
772, 780 (Okla. 1991); In re Initiative Petition No. 341, State Question No. 627, 796 P.2d 267,
269 (Okla. 1990); In re Initiative Petition No. 315, State Question No. 553, 649 P.2d 545,
547-48 (Okla. 1982)).
181. OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 8(c) (2011) ("Upon the filing of a protest to the petition, the
Supreme Court shall then fix a day, not less than ten (10) days thereafter, at which time it
will hear testimony and arguments for and against the sufficiency of such petition.").
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substance of the initiative, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
interpreted "sufficiency" to include legal sufficiency. 18 2 Thus, the courts in
Oklahoma are not shackled even by a standard that a proposed initiative
must be clearly unconstitutional before it will review its substance.
Such an unbridled assault by the courts on the legislative will of the
people, before that will has been enacted or even implemented, goes against
recent United States Supreme Court precedent in Arizona v. United
States183:
The nature and timing of this case counsel caution in evaluating
the validity of § 2(B). The Federal Government has brought suit
against a sovereign State to challenge the provision even before
the law has gone into effect. There is a basic uncertainty about
what the law means and how it will be enforced. At this stage,
without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state
courts, it would be inappropriate to assume § 2(B) will be
construed in a way that creates a conflict ... .
The Court held that it is "improper to enjoin [a law] before the state courts
[have] had an opportunity to construe it" after it has been enacted."' In
fact, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it has long understood that
"state laws will be construed in [a] way" that "avoid[s] doubtful
constitutional questions.""' The Court refused to adjudicate section 2(B)
prior to its implementation, whereas in the case of a substantive review of
proposed initiatives, the courts are striking them down before their
enactment. This recent decision chastising the federal government for
bringing a pre-implementation claim moves the Supreme Court one step
closer to disallowing pre-enactment reviews and should dissuade state
courts from allowing such challenges to proceed. Such action by a court-
asserting itself into the legislative process-will continue to effect courts'
credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the public.'
182. In re Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637, 637 ("A
protest to the legal sufficiency of an initiative petition must now be heard by this Court in
advance of a challenge to the numerical sufficiency of the initiative petition." (citing OKLA.
STAT. tit. 34, § 8 (2011))).
183. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
184. Id. at 2510.
185. Id. at 2496.
186. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
187. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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III. SILENCING THE BALLOT-IN RE INITIATIVE PETITION No. 349
A. General Grant of Pre-Enactment Review in Modern Oklahoma
Jurisprudence
Oklahoma courts have, for the last several decades, conferred upon
themselves and exercised the power to engage in pre-enactment review of
ballot initiatives.'" In fact, the Oklahoma Supreme Court actually
references its "reverence for the initiative rights guaranteed by the
Oklahoma Constitution" for its reasons to engage in this type of review.'
Nevertheless, this rule generally allowing review of the substance of ballot
initiatives in order to "prevent the holding of a costly and unnecessary
election""o was not the rule followed by Oklahoma courts for the better part
of the 20th century.19'
1. The Original Rule from Threadgrill
Threadgill v. Cross provided the original'rule that an initiative petition
need only meet the procedural requirements as set out in the Oklahoma
Constitution to qualify for submission to a vote of the people.' This would
require any initiative whose proponents seek placement on the ballot to
comply with the "sine qua non procedural requirements for submission,"
receive the required number of valid signatures, pertain to only a single
subject, and concern a subject that has not been explicitly excluded from the
people's lawmaking power.' Further, this was the rule used by Oklahoma
courts from 1910 until 1975.19' The Court in Threadgill, and the proponents
188. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 8 (Okla. 1992);
see also In re Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637 (Okla. 2012);
In re Initiative Petition No. 348, State Question No. 640, 820 P.2d 772, 780 (Okla. 1991); In re
Initiative Petition No. 341, State Question No. 627, 796 P.2d 267, 269 (Okla. 1990); In re
Initiative Petition No. 315, State Question No. 553, 649 P.2d 545, 547-48 (Okla. 1982); In re
Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Okla., 534 P.2d 3, 8 (Okla.
1975).
189. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 10.
190. Id. at 8.
191. See Threadgill v. Cross, 109 P. 558, 562 (1910); see also In re Petitions in Norman,
Okla., 534 P.2d at 8.
192. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 383 P.2d at 20 (Opla, J., dissenting).
193. Id.
194. Id.; see also In re Petitions in Norman, Okla., 534 P.2d at 8.
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of the rule promulgated therein, looked to the separation of powers to
justify its decision to disallow pre-enactment reviews.'
Threadgill presented a problem slightly different than that discussed
throughout the majority of this Comment. The controversy brought before
the court in that case was not initiated by the opponents of the ballot
initiative at issue, but rather by its proponents.'96 Although the initiative had
met the procedural requirements as laid out in the Oklahoma Constitution,
the Secretary of State believed that, if ratified, the initiative would conflict
with another legislative act and thus be void.' Because of this belief, he
refused to refer the initiative to the electorate for approval or rejection.'
Consequently, the proponents brought action against the Secretary and
asked the court for a writ of mandamus to compel him to submit the
initiative to the electorate.'99 Thus, the court was being asked to actually
force an election for the initiative, rather than being asked to forbear on
reviewing the substance of the initiative. This is an important distinction
because this asks a court to take an even more resolute stance regarding the
right of the people to enact a ballot initiative. Some jurisdictions that will
generally refrain from entertaining a pre-enactment, substantive challenge
to a ballot initiative will not grant a mandamus to compel an election.200
The court in Threadgill, however, recognized the right of the people to
have a procedurally sufficient initiative submitted to the electorate.2 01
Further, the court did not allow the Secretary of State to use the
constitutionality of the substance of that initiative as a defense in a
mandamus proceeding.202 The court relied on the presumption that
"provisions of the state Constitution and statutes are . . . valid."2 0 3
Additionally, the court rejected the parens patriae argument for standing
asserted by the Secretary of State that "[h] e was testing the constitutionality
195. Threadgill, 109 P. at 561-62; see also In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 383 P.2d at 20
(Opla, C.J., dissenting).
196. Threadgill, 109 P. at 558.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 559.
200. See State ex rel. Bussie v. Fant, 43 So. 2d 217, 219 (La. 1949); see also Utz v. City of
Newport, 252 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Ky. 1952).
201. Threadgill, 109 P. at 563.
202. Id. at 559.
203. Id.
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of the law purely in the interest of third persons, viz., the taxpayers." 204 The
court instead would require a personal-not an official-interest20 5 asserted
by a person who would have wanted an enactment struck down as
unconstitutional because "his rights are affected by the alleged invalid
act."106 The court would rather force an official to perform a "purely
ministerial" and "mandatory" act207 than allow for relaxed requirements for
standing to challenge legislative acts of the people by presuming some
injury.208
The court did not simply ignore the argument that the cost of holding an
election for an initiative that would likely be proved invalid outweighs the
people's right to exercise their legislative authority.209 Rather than
restraining the rights of the people due to costs, the court extolled the
Republican system of government by supporting the separation of
powers.2"0 The court even noted that "[i]t may be that a government all of
whose powers are administered by one department may be administered
with less expense than a [Republican form ofJ government." 2 11 However, it
is the proper and constitutional form of government to leave the legislative
authority in the hands of those vested with legislative power and allowing
the other branches the authority to review those legislative acts only after
"they come to be enforced against some one. "212
Consequently, the court granted the writ of mandamus to compel the
election.213 It justified this decision by invoking certain justiciability issues,
such as standing and the doctrine of separation of powers.2 14 Ultimately, the
court decided that it must compel the Secretary to submit the initiative to
the people because "[t]he duty of determining what law shall be enacted and
204. Id. at 561.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 559.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 560 ('"A party who seeks to have an act of the Legislature declared
unconstitutional must not only show that he is or will be injured by it, but he must also show
how and in what respect he is or will be injured and prejudiced by it. Injury will not be
presumed. It must be shown."' (citations omitted)).
209. Id. at 562.
210. Id. at 562-63.
211. Id. at 562.
212. Id. at 562-63.
213. Id. at 563.
214. Id.
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what law shall not be enacted rests neither upon the executive nor the
judicial department."2 1 5
2. Modern Rule Generally Granting Pre-Enactment Reviews
The Oklahoma Supreme Court broke from this rule in 1975, declaring
that it had the authority to "consider the constitutionality of [initiatives] as
to procedure form and subject matter, when raised, and if ... such a
determination could prevent a costly and unnecessary election." 216 Since
then, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has regularly exercised that authority it
conferred upon itself217 Unlike the jurisdictions that limit this authority to
only extreme instances of patent unconstitutionality,218 Oklahoma declared
in In re Initiative Petition No. 349 that it would hear any and all substantive
challenges to a ballot initiative once it had garnered the constitutionally
required number of signatures.219 More recently, it has even expanded this
authority to initiatives that have not received the requisite number of
signatures.220
Specifically in In re Initiative Petition No. 349, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court struck down an initiative that would amend the Oklahoma
215. Id. at 562.
216. In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Okla., 534 P.2d
3, 8 (Okla. 1975).
217. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 8 (Okla. 1992);
see also In re Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637 (Okla. 2012);
In re Initiative Petition No. 348, State Question No. 640, 820 P.2d 772, 780 (Okla. 1991); In re
Initiative Petition No. 341, State Question No. 627, 796 P.2d 267, 269 (Okla. 1990); In re
Initiative Petition No. 315, State Question No. 553, 649 P.2d 545, 547-48 (Okla. 1982); In re
Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Okla. 534 P.2d 3, 8 (Okla.
1975).
218. Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 574 (D.C. 1992) ("(W]e stop short of joining the list
of jurisdictions which forbid pre-election review of constitutional challenges to proposed
initiatives. We agree with the majority of courts which hold that such review is imprudent.
But there may be extreme cases in which it would be both appropriate and efficient to decide
the constitutionality of a proposed initiative. An initiative proposing to establish an official
religion in the District of Columbia, for example, would be patently unconstitutional.").
219. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 10 (Okla. 1992)
("However, if an unconstitutional measure garners enough signatures to be presented to the
people and is challenged on constitutional grounds, pre-submission judicial review is
appropriate.").
220. See, e.g., In re Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637
(Okla. 2012).
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Constitution to limit abortions to a set of defined circumstances.22' it
justified striking the initiative down citing the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution,2 22 the Supreme Court's holdings in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey223 and Roe v. Wade,224 and its own holdings.225 The
court determined that the initiative "was unconstitutional when it was
drafted, circulated, and submitted" and that, if it were ratified by the
electorate, "the Oklahoma Constitution [would] be repugnant to the
[United States] Constitution" in light of Casey.22 6
This ruling was not without ardent dissent. One justice characterized the
court's decision as an exercise of legislative power and a "flagrant
encroachment upon the people's legislative powers."227 In fact, the dissent
pointed out that in order to support its decision, the majority necessarily
relied on "erroneous and sensational legal findings" regarding the
provisions and effect of the initiative (were it even to be enacted) and the
court's own authority in making such adjudications.228 Despite the
impassioned arguments for judicial restraint and adherence to the
Threadgill rule,229 In re Initiative Petition No. 349 and its interpretation of
federal abortion jurisprudence has been used as precedent to strike down
other initiatives.2 30
B. Misapplication of Federal Law
The initiative in In Re Initiative Petition No. 349 dealt directly with
abortion and contained provisions regarding state control of and limiting
some access to those services.23' Thus, an argument might be reasonably
made that the initiative in In re Initiative Petition No. 349 might have
adversely affected rights that the Supreme Court has articulated under
221. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. 1992).
222. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
223. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
224. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
225. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 7-9 (Okla.
1992).
226. Id. at 9-10.
227. Id. at 15 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 17 n.12 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 20-28. (Opala, C.J., dissenting).
230. See, e.g., In re Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637
(Okla. 2012).
231. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 7.
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Casey, assuming it had ever been enacted and implemented. The same
cannot be said, however, about initiatives that do not deal directly with
abortion,232 but rather mirror language from legislation that the Supreme
Court refused to strike down prior to its implementation. 233
The Supreme Court has made it clear that a court should not pass upon
the constitutional validity of a state law which has not yet been applied to a
party in the manner anticipated to cause injury.' This is due to the fact
that without any "authoritative construction" of the law, "no constitutional
question arises." 235 Thus, until the law is "applied to restrict the activities of
[a party] in some concrete way" a court should not entertain a review
because the court "'is not empowered to decide abstract propositions, or to
declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the results as to the thing in issue in the case before it.'"'2 6
In Webster, the Court was asked to review the preamble of an Act passed
by the Missouri Legislature that contained language similar to that found in
the initiative struck down by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in In re
Initiative Petition No. 395.237 The Missouri Act set forth "findings" that
"[t]he life of each human being begins at conception" and that "[u]nborn
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being."238
Nevertheless, because the plaintiffs who brought the claim against the
statute only alleged that the preamble might cause them injury if
implemented a particular way, the Court refused to pass on the
constitutionality of the preamble.23 9 The Court also emphasized that every
State has the authority "'to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
232. The Oklahoma Supreme Court used the same arguments and logic applied in In Re
Initiative Petition No. 349 to invalidate an initiative that would define a "person" as any
human being from the beginning of biological development to natural death. Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 2, In re Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637
(Okla. 2012), No. 12-145, 2012 WL 3109490, at *2.
233. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 490 (1989).
234. Id. at 506; see also Ala. State Fed'n of Labor, Local Union No. 103 v. McAdory, 325
U.S. 450, 460 (1945).
235. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506.
236. Id. at 506-07.
237. Compare Id. at 490, with Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Initiative Petition No.
395 State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637 (Okla. 2012), No. 12-145, 2012 WL 3109490, at *2.
238. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1), (2) (1986).
239. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 505-07.
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abortion' and that "[t]he preamble can be read simply to express that sort
of value judgment."240
Additionally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that .'[iin
evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court must ... consider
any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has
proffered." 24 1 Thus, Oklahoma may very well have the opportunity afforded
to it that the Court provided Missouri.242 In addition to its holding that the
preamble of the Missouri law could be read to appropriately express "a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion,"243 the Court also held
that the preamble could have been used to merely offer "protections to
unborn children in tort and probate law."2" Thus, until it was used to
restrict the activities of the plaintiffs in some concrete way, it could not be
held facially invalid.245 Consequently, the Court decided to wait for it to be
applied in a manner that actually restricted the activities of the plaintiffs.2"
Similar to the situation faced by the Court in Arizona v. United States,2 47
the Webster Court was confronted with, but refused to rule on, the
substantive constitutionality of legislation prior to its implementation.2 48
Conversely, in the case of a substantive review of proposed initiatives, state
courts are striking them down before their enactment.
Oklahoma has blatantly misapplied federal law when it struck down
language that mirrored language of the Missouri Act upheld by the
Supreme Court in Webster.2 49 In In re Initiative Petition No. 395, the
challenged initiative had not even been enacted, much less implemented;
thus, it is impossible that it restricted a party's rights in some concrete
way.250 Additionally, the Supreme Court might be able to find a set of
circumstances in tort and probate law where that initiative would be
240. Id. at 506 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977)).
241. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1989) (quoting Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982)).
242. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 506.
243. Id. (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
244. Id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62 (1973).
245. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506.
246. Id. at 506-07.
247. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).
248. Webster, 492 U.S. at 490.
249. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No.
761, 286 P.3d 637 (Okla. 2012), No. 12-145, 2012 WL 3109490, at *2.
250. In re Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637 (Okla. 2012).
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constitutional, and thus a facial challenge would fail under the Salerno
standard.251' Therefore, because the Oklahoma Supreme Court should not be
"'empowered to decide . .. abstract propositions, or to declare . . .principles
or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the
case before it,"' the only appropriate thing for the court to do is to wait for
an actual case or controversy to be presented to it.25 2
IV. A LIMITED FEDERAL REMEDY
A. When Federal Review of State Court Activity Is Appropriate
The Supreme Court has afforded "considerable leeway" to states that
provide for ballot initiatives to "protect the integrity and reliability of the
initiative process, as they have with respect to election processes
generally."253 It has also stated that "'no litmus-paper test' will separate valid
ballot-access provisions from invalid interactive speech restrictions" and
that it has yet to come upon a "'substitute for the hard judgments that must
be made."'254 Nevertheless, "the First Amendment requires us to be vigilant
in making those judgments, to guard against undue hindrances to political
conversations and the exchange of ideas."255 The Supreme Court has stated
that it "has jurisdiction whenever 'a state court decision fairly appears to
rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and
when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is
not clear from the face of the opinion.' 25 6 Where a state high court relies
exclusively on federal law to strike down a ballot initiative, as the Oklahoma
Supreme Court did in In re Initiative Petition No. 349, federal courts
assuredly have jurisdiction to protect the liberty interests at stake involved
in the ballot initiative process. 257
251. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 161-62 (1973).
252. Webtser, 492 U.S. at 507 (quoting Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S.
405, 409 (1900)); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982).
253. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 191 (1999).
254. Id. at 192 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (citations omitted)).
255. Id.
256. Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 171 (2009) (quoting Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)).
257. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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1. Adequate and Independent Grounds
Generally, issues involved in the state ballot initiative process implicate
purely state issues. Further, when a state court's judgment relies on
"adequate and independent state grounds," the right of the federal courts to
review the matter is limited to merely "correct them to the extent that they
incorrectly adjudge federal rights."258 This doctrine requires a two-fold
assessment-the adequacy of the state basis for decision and its
independence from federal law."' This doctrine strikes a balance between a
respect for the independence of state courts that is well ingrained in our
federalist system and the right of federal courts to review a state court's
judgment when it affects federal interests. 26 0
Federal courts will assume that state courts felt that they were bound by
federal law if (1) the state court decision "fairly appears to rest primarily on
federal law," (2) that decision is "interwoven with the federal law," or (3)
"when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is
not clear from the face of the opinion."' Conversely, state courts may
make it clear that they have merely used federal precedent in the same
manner as other state courts, thus bolstering the interpretation that an
opinion was decided on adequate and independent state grounds, by using
a "plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases [were]
used only for the purpose of guidance."262
This plain statement acts as a type of mechanical presumption that the
state court decision is unreviewable, although such a presumption may be
easily overcome with a showing that a federal interest is involved. 263 Despite
the availability of this presumption by merely including one sentence, many
of the courts that have declared ballot initiatives unconstitutional have not
availed themselves of this protection from federal review.26 Further, even if
Oklahoma courts used such a statement, doing so would provide little
258. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
259. CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 30 (Vicki
Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009).
260. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1041.
263. MASSEY, supra note 259, at 31.
264. See, e.g., Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 574 (D.C. 1992); State ex rel. Harper v.
Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826 (Mont. 1984); Brosnahan v. Eu, 641 P.2d 200, 201 (Cal. 1982);
Gray v. Winthrop, 156 So. 270, 272 (Fla. 1934).
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protection as Oklahoma courts have blatantly relied upon federal law when
declaring certain initiatives unconstitutional prior to their enactment.265
Specifically within the context of the ballot initiative process, the
Supreme Court has left the door open on whether federal interests in
political participation and discussion would justify federal review of these
types of pre-enactment reviews.2" Thus, a state court may find it difficult to
claim that federal review of its decision would be precluded by the adequate
and independent doctrine because of the strong federal interest in First
Amendment rights.
2. Federal Interests Implicated in the Initiative Process
In Meyer v. Grant,267 the Supreme Court found that "the circulation of a
petition involves the type of interactive communication concerning political
change that is appropriately described as 'core political speech." 26 The
Court also counseled that the speech at issue in that case was political
discourse on a matter of public concern, which is "'at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms"' and was "an area
of public policy where protection of robust discussion is at its zenith."269
Consequently, because the case involved "a limitation on political
expression," it was "subject to exacting scrutiny."270 The Court therefore
applied strict scrutiny and determined that Colorado's statute prohibiting
the payment of circulators violated the First Amendment.2 11
There, the Supreme Court determined that protecting the exchange of
political discourse on a matter of great public concern in the context of a
ballot initiative was a worthwhile consideration. The Court again reiterated
this concern within the context of ballot initiatives when it stated that the
First Amendment requires the Court "to be vigilant in making those
265. See In re Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637 (Okla.
2012); In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 7-9 (Okla. 1992).
266. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 192 (1999); Meyer
v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,421-22 (1988).
267. Meyer, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
268. Id. at 421-22.
269. Id. at 425 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
270. Id. at 420 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45).
271. Id. at 428.
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judgments, to guard against undue hindrances to political conversations
and the exchange of ideas."272
The interests federal courts have in protecting the rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment that extend into the state ballot initiative process may
be sufficient to compel federal review of a state court's pre-enactment
decision to declare an initiative unconstitutional-especially when that
court relies on federal law for its decision. 273 Government restrictions on the
initiative right that limit the advocacy of legislation are "wholly at odds with
the guarantees of the First Amendment." 274 Thus, the initiative right
receives some protection from the federal Constitution to the extent that
any state regulation of that right violates core political speech rights, equal
protection, due process, right of association, etc. 7 The circuit courts,
however, are divided over the review of state ballot initiative decisions.276
B. Circuit Court Split over the Availability of Federal Appeal
The federal courts of appeal are divided over the review of ballot
initiatives and regulations thereof. They disagree as to the nature of the
rights implicated when the initiative right is infringed as well as the
standard of review to be applied when it occurs. The First and Ninth
Circuits recognize the federal interests in the core political speech rights
that are implicated in restrictions on the initiative right.277 On the other
hand, the Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits are more
hesitant to recognize the free speech implications with restrictions on and
judicial involvement in the ballot initiative process.278
272. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 192 (1999).
273. See supra note 24.
274. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 428 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50).
275. Election Law Manual, supra note 17, at 4-2; see also Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d
1069, 1101 (Utah 2002) (Thorne, J., dissenting).
276. See generally Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2012); Initiative and
Referendum Institute v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1094 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Wirzburger
v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 276 (1st Cir. 2005); Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1497-98
(11th Cir. 1996).
277. Wirzburger, 412 F.3d at 276; Angle, 673 F.3d at 1133.
278. See Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1094 (10th Cir.
2006) (en banc) (affirming a decision to strike down a ballot initiative prior to its enactment
because pre-submission review of a ballot initiative does not restrict First Amendment
Rights); Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 F.3d 82, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding
that certain procedural requirements, such as a single subject limitation, are not so restrictive
that they implicate the First Amendment); Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1497-98
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In Angle v. Miller,279 proponents of an initiative challenged the
constitutionality of a Nevada rule that required a minimum number of
signatures be collected from each district in Nevada before the initiative
could receive placement on the ballot. The Ninth Circuit held that "as
applied to the initiative process, . . . ballot access restrictions place a severe
burden on core political speech, and trigger strict scrutiny, when they
significantly inhibit the ability of initiative proponents to place initiatives on
the ballot."280
In Wirzburger v. Galvin,281 the provision in the Massachusetts
constitution prohibiting an initiative relating to public financing for private,
religiously-affiliated schools was challenged on the grounds of free speech,
free exercise of religion, and equal protection.282 There, the court explained
that ballot initiatives "provide[] a uniquely provocative and effective
method of spurring public debate on an issue of importance to the
proponents of the proposed initiative."283 Citing Meyer, the court found that
"the process involved in proposing legislation by means of initiative
involves core political speech."284
The Wirzburger court also noted, however, that the state initiative
procedure also includes regulations aimed at "non-communicative
impact."285 Because the regulations in that case were directed at this non-
communicative aspect, the First Circuit concluded that intermediate
scrutiny was the appropriate standard to apply.286 The First Circuit did note,
however, that where the government action "involved direct regulation of
the petition process itself[,]" strict scrutiny would apply.287
In Initiative & Referendum Institute v. Walker,288 the Tenth Circuit held
that there was no violation of the First Amendment even where an initiative
(11th Cir. 1996) (finding that there had not been a substantial restriction of political
discussion).
279. Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012).
280. Id. at 1133 (finding in favor of the state because the court determined that the
restrictions did not significantly inhibit proponents from placing the initiative on the ballot).
281. Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271 (1st Cir.2005).
282. Id. at 274.
283. Id. at 276.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 275 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 at
790 (2d ed.1988)).
286. Id. at 279 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
287. Id. at 277.
288. Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
2013] 203
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
was struck down as unconstitutional in a pre-enactment ruling by a state
supreme court."9 The court stated that "the Oklahoma Supreme Court had
'done nothing to restrict speech"' because no one had "been silenced by pre-
submission content review."29 o
That court relied on an earlier case29-Skrzypczak v. Kauger.292 There,
the Tenth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs challenge for lack of standing.293
The Oklahoma Supreme Court had ruled that an initiative proposing a state
constitutional amendment violated the federal constitution.294 The plaintiff,
however, was not even one of the proponents of the initiative that had been
struck from the ballot.295 She nevertheless asserted a First Amendment right
to have the issue placed on the ballot.2 96 Unsurprisingly, the court rejected
that claim.297
The Eleventh Circuit declined to provide the kind of protection hinted at
by the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Grant, where it ruled that ballot
initiatives implicate "core political speech." 298 Rather, the Eleventh Circuit
has held that "[aibsent some showing that the initiative process
substantially restricts political discussion . . .Meyer is inapplicable" in the
context of a procedural challenge to rules such as a single-subject rule or a
rule governing ballot titles. 299 Additionally, in Marijuana Policy Project v.
United States,300 the D.C. Circuit held that a restriction on the subject
289. Id. at 1100-01.
290. Id. at 1094 (quoting Skrzypczakv. Kauger, 92 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 1996)).
291. Id.
292. Skrzypczak v. Kauger, 92 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1996).
293. Id. at 1053 ("We hold that Skrzypczak lacks standing because her complaint fails to
allege an injury in fact.").
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1051.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988); Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491,
1497-98 (11th Cir. 1996).
299. Biddulph, 89 F.3d at 1497-98 (distinguishing between "regulation of the circulation
of petitions-which is 'core political speech-and a state's general initiative regulations,"
which are not subject to heightened scrutiny); see also Gibson v. Firestone, 741 F.2d 1268,
1272-73 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The state, having created such a procedure, retains the authority
to interpret its scope and availability.").
300. Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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matter of a proposed ballot initiative "restricts no speech""o' and, therefore,
"does not implicate the First Amendment."302
The confusion of the lower courts is evidenced by the differing standards
applied to complaints by citizens seeking to exercise fundamental rights.
This diversity of opinions underscores the need for the Supreme Court to
resolve the conflict.303 While most of the focus of these federal decisions
revolved around limitations in the process, there have been very few
decisions actually discussing pre-enactment reviews and subsequent
declarations of unconstitutionality.o Other than in the Tenth Circuit, it
would stand to reason that the courts would find pre-enactment
declarations of the unconstitutionality of initiatives to be violative of the
First Amendment because it constitutes a substantial restriction on political
discussion.o Further, the Supreme Court's ruling in Meyer clearly indicates
that the federal courts have an interest in protecting the "core political
speech" rights that are implicated in the ballot initiative process. 306
It may be argued that federal courts would be bound by an abstention or
other doctrine that would require the court to refuse hearing the case;30o
however, no abstention doctrine would bar federal courts from reviewing a
state court's decision to strike down an initiative if that state court relied on
federal law to do so or if a federal interest is implicated. For example, the
Pullman abstention doctrine0 ' "allows federal courts to refrain from
301. Id. at 85.
302. Id. at 86.
303. Specifically, the Court should address the tensions between (1) this state-created
initiative right, (2) a state court judgment which may rely on federal substantive law, (3) the
adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, and (4) the federal interests implicated in
such an impediment to the people's ability to enact legislation.
304. See Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing the constitutionality of
the procedural signature requirement); Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271 (1st Cir. 2005)
(discussing the constitutionality of the exclusion of certain topics within the initiative right);
Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (determining that
procedural restrictions on the initiative right do not "substantially restrict[] political
discussion"); Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1497-98 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing
general, procedural restrictions on the initiative right). But see Initiative and Referendum
Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (ruling that no speech was
restricted even where an initiative was struck down as unconstitutional in a pre-election
ruling by a state supreme court).
305. See, e.g., Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1497-98 (11th Cir. 1996).
306. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,421-22 (1988).
307. See, e.g., Biddulphv. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491,1495 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996).
308. See generally Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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deciding sensitive federal constitutional questions when state law issues
may moot or narrow the constitutional questions."3 " In this context,
however, the state court has already had a full opportunity to hear the case.
Thus, Pullman abstention would be inapplicable because a state court ruling
would moot or narrow the constitutional issues implicated.310 Further,
Burford abstention" allows federal courts to abstain where the state courts
likely have greater expertise in a particularly complex area of state law.312
However, where a state court relies on federal law, as the Oklahoma
Supreme Court did in In re Initiative Petition No. 349," or where
important federal interests are implicated, these abstention doctrines do not
bar a federal court from reviewing the decision.
These federal interests should compel review of state court decisions to
prematurely strike down ballot initiatives, especially where, as in Oklahoma,
federal law provides the primary basis for that decision. The Supreme Court
should resolve the conflict among the state and federal courts regarding the
restriction of political discussion and the stifling of the legislative process
through pre-enactment reviews of ballot initiatives. If it is consistent with
its recent decision in Arizona v. United States,31 4 the Court must determine
that the issues of justiciability and general disfavor towards facial attacks
would preclude such reviews in nearly all situations.1 Proponents of ballot
initiatives that have been faced with substantive challenges to those
initiatives prior to their enactment should pursue a federal remedy where
the state court has struck down that initiative primarily because of federal
law or where core political speech has been stifled.
309. San Remo Hotel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir.
1998).
310. Id.
311. See generally Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
312. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 725 (1996).
313. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 7-9 (Okla. 1992).
314. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
315. In Arizona, the Court ruled that "[t]he Federal Government [had] brought suit
against a sovereign State to challenge the provision even before the law [had] gone into
effect." Id. at 2510. The Court refused to strike down the challenged section of the Arizona
law because "[tihere is a basic uncertainty about what the law means and how it will be
enforced." Id. If challenging the constitutionality of law after its enactment but prior to its
enforcement was inappropriate, the Court would be hard pressed to justify allowing a state to
challenge and declare ballot initiatives unconstitutional even prior to its enactment.
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These proponents may petition a federal court of appeals for review3" or
even go directly to the United States Supreme Court.317 They might even file
a new lawsuit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a particular
official, such as a Secretary of State, has refused to place the initiative on the
ballot. 318 Regardless of the avenue taken by the proponents of an initiative,
when a state has improperly impeded the people's right to enact legislation,
the federal courts have an interest in entertaining a review if the state court
has relied on federal law in its decision or if federal interests are implicated.
V. CONCLUSION
The American political order demands compliance with the simple
axiom that "the legislature makes the laws, the executive enforces the laws,
and the judiciary interprets and applies the laws."1 In an effort to comply
with this sentiment the Supreme Court has held that it is "improper to
enjoin [a law] before the state courts [have] had an opportunity to construe
it" after it has been enacted.320 Further the Court has traditionally construed
state laws in such a way that "avoid[s] doubtful constitutional questions." 321
When a state court decides to entertain a pre-enactment review of a
ballot initiative and strike it down as unconstitutional, it disregards and
violates numerous traditions and concepts of American justice. This kind of
action disregards the principle of self-government and the idea that political
power inherently resides in the people.322 It discounts principles of standing
316. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Initiative and Referendum Inst. v.
Walker, 450 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2006), No. 06-534, 2006 WL2985280.
317. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Initiative Petition No. 395 State
Question No. 761,286 P.3d 637 (Okla. 2012), No. 12-145, 2012 WL 3109490.
318. Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1494-95 (11th Cir. 1996). This last option,
however, would require the proponents to prove that the Rooker-Feldman abstention
doctrine is inapplicable. See id. at 1495 n.1; see also District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 480-82 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally provides that federal courts have no authority to
review final judgments of state courts. Biddulph, 89 F.3d at 1495 n.1. To avail themselves of
an exception to this doctrine, the proponents would have to prove that they had no
"reasonable opportunity to raise [their] federal claim in state proceedings." Id. (quoting
Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464,467 (11th Cir.1996)).
319. Collett, supra note 12, at 347.
320. Id. at 2496.
321. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915); see Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
322. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222 n.48 (1962).
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and ripeness323 because legislation that has yet to be enacted cannot "restrict
[a party's rights] in some concrete way."324 It ignores the doctrine of the
separation of powers"' and amounts to an advisory opinion.326 It removes
the legislative authority from those vested with legislative power,327 and fails
to provide courts an opportunity to actually construe and apply the
language of the initiative should it be enacted.3 28
Further, the Supreme Court has long understood that "public
confidence" is "vitally critical to [the judiciary and] may well erode if self-
restraint is not exercised in the utilization of the power to negate" the will of
the people.3 29 That public confidence is based upon a belief that "the people
have authorized the judiciary to rule upon disputes based upon the law and
that the court rulings are unbiased applications of existing law. Destroy
confidence in either of these propositions, and the authority of the court
disappears."3 o If the courts continue to ignore canons of justiciability,"'
lower the standards so that facial attacks may be brought more often and
succeed with greater ease,332 misapply federal law,333 and trample on First
Amendment speech,334 they will continue to, in the eyes of the public,
become more of a political branch that asserts its own legislative will.
323. See supra, Part II.B.1.a.
324. Webster v. Reprod. Heath Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 506 (1989).
325. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
326. See supra Part II.B.1.c.
327. Threadgill v. Cross, 109 P. 558, 562-63 (1910); see supra note 212.
328. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 507; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62 (1973); see also
supra note 252.
329. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
330. Collett, supra note 12, at 347.
331. See supra Part II.B.1.
332. See supra Part II.B.2.
333. See supra Part III.B.
334. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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